Ghost Contracts in the V.League: The Loan-With-Obligation-To-Buy Machine and the Price Paid by Small Clubs
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi:** Cho mượn kèm nghĩa vụ mua đứt tại V.League là cấu trúc trong đó đội nhỏ mượn cầu thủ và cam kết mua đứt vào cuối mùa, với phí mua đứt ghi trong phụ lục riêng biệt, ngoài hợp đồng chính gửi ban tổ chức giải. **Dữ kiện chính:** - Phí mua đứt được ghi trong phụ lục, chỉ hai bên và một luật sư biết; hợp đồng chính gửi lên ban tổ chức giải. - Ngân sách mùa của một đội hạng trung V.League khoảng 40 đến 60 tỷ đồng; lương cầu thủ đội tuyển quốc gia 30 đến 50 triệu đồng một tháng. - Năm 2017, một vụ chuyển nhầm 480 triệu đồng vào tài khoản công ty bóng đá khác được phát hiện qua hợp đồng đào tạo của tiền vệ U17 tại sân Hòa Xuân. - Người đại diện thu phí ba lần cho một lần di chuyển: phí cho mượn, phần trăm lương, và phí kích hoạt nghĩa vụ mua đứt. - Một đội bóng nhỏ miền Trung để đi tám cầu thủ trẻ trong năm mùa, trong đó năm người theo dạng cho mượn kèm nghĩa vụ mua đứt. **Nguồn:** Phân tích của tác giả Ngô Phong, cập nhật ngày 12 tháng 1 năm 2025, dựa trên các cuộc gọi xác minh với người đại diện và hồ sơ chuyển nhượng công khai của V.League | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan:** - Hợp đồng bóng ma tại V.League là gì? Là cấu trúc hai lớp, trong đó hợp đồng chính công khai với ban tổ chức giải còn phụ lục chứa phí mua đứt chỉ hai bên biết. - Vì sao các đội bóng nhỏ V.League chấp nhận cho mượn kèm nghĩa vụ mua đứt? Vì họ không có quỹ dự phòng và cần trì hoãn chi phí sang mùa sau để tránh xuống hạng, theo chỉ số độ sâu đội hình của VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. - Nghĩa vụ mua đứt kích hoạt thì điều gì xảy ra? Đội nhỏ phải trả phí đã chốt trong phụ lục, thường trả chậm nhiều năm, và đôi khi phải bán thêm một cầu thủ khác để cân đối.
At 2:14 a.m. on January 12, 2026, my phone rang. On the screen was the name of an agent I had known since the 2026 season — a man I had called throughout three months of the pandemic to ask about twenty V.League contracts about to expire. He was one of the fourteen agents I had compiled onto a list five years earlier, when the stadiums closed and ticket money vanished.
"I just closed a deal in the central region," he said, his voice hoarse from lack of sleep. "Not a sale. A loan. But with an obligation to buy at the end of the season. The buy-out fee is in an appendix, not in the main contract."
I asked again to be sure: "An appendix?"
"Yes. The main contract goes to the league organizers, pretty as a picture. The appendix is known only to the two parties and one lawyer. A ghost contract, exactly."
I sat up and opened my laptop. Outside the window, Da Nang was drizzling. And I understood that the people market had just opened a new session, right in the middle of the night, at exactly the hour when no reporter is still awake.
A ghost contract never lives on paper; it lives in a two a.m. phone call.
The player in that deal was a 22-year-old midfielder from the central region who had worn the Vietnam U23 shirt exactly once in a friendly. Not a star. But good enough for a small club to need, and cheap enough for a big club to want to keep control of. On the surface, it was an ordinary loan in the mid-season transfer window. Seen from the corridor, it was an accounting machine.
I will retell the structure of that machine, because it is reshaping how small V.League clubs survive. To understand it, one must start where everything starts: the revenue of a mid-table Vietnamese club.
A V.League club does not live on tickets. Living on tickets is a story from fifteen years ago. In the 2026-2026 season, ticket revenue for most clubs makes up only a small share of total income; the bulk comes from the sponsorship of the parent company and from selling players. When the parent company struggles, the club struggles first. When the club struggles, young players are the only still-liquid asset.
Here lies a paradox I have observed for nine years. Vietnam's small clubs are praised for developing well, but precisely because they develop well, they can never keep their people. Their academies are assembly lines producing semi-finished goods. The product leaves the oven beautiful, but the oven has no money to keep the product in place. And so the loan-with-obligation-to-buy machine appears, as a solution both sides need and both sides must hide.
I once watched a match at Hoa Xuan Stadium in March 2026, when SHB Da Nang hosted a northern club. In the first half, I did not watch the ball. I watched the bench. Three players sat there whom I knew for certain were on the visiting club's books, even though they wore the home shirt. They had arrived on loan. One of the three had an obligation to buy written into an appendix. The other two did not. The difference between those three men, on the bench, was invisible to anyone in the stands.

The stadium is empty, the stands are empty, but the people market still meets over the phone.
To understand why a small club accepts this structure, look at the numbers. A mid-table V.League club has a seasonal budget of roughly 40 to 60 billion dong, depending on the club and the year. Of that, the wage bill takes the largest share. If that club wants a quality player — say a central midfielder who has played for the national team — it must pay a wage the budget cannot afford, often 30 to 50 million dong a month, plus bonuses. A three-year contract for that player could swallow nearly half the club's entire transfer budget.
A loan with an obligation to buy solves that problem in a very particular way. The small club does not buy the player immediately. It borrows him, pays part of the wage, sometimes only board and match bonuses. At season's end, if the player performs and the club avoids relegation, the buy obligation triggers. But the clever — and poisonous — part is this: that obligation is written in an appendix, at a pre-agreed fee, payable in installments over several years.
What does the big club gain? It keeps control of the player, pushes part of the wage off the current season's books, and if the player shines, it collects a buy-out fee already priced in advance. If the player fails, it can still reclaim him. In both scenarios, the big club carries less risk than the small one. That is why I have said for years: a loan with an obligation to buy is not an equal deal. It is an insurance contract for which the small club pays the premium, while the big club collects the payout.
But wait. Before concluding, I must tell the part few mention: the agent's side. In that central-region deal that night, the agent told me something I recorded verbatim: "My brokerage fee is not in the buy-out fee. It is in the loan fee, plus a percentage of the wage the borrowing club pays." That means the agent earns at both ends: a sum when the player leaves, a sum when the player arrives, and another when the buy obligation triggers. Three paydays for one move.
The player is merchandise, the agent is a merchant, and I stand in the middle of the market taking notes.
This is where I must retell an old story, because it explains why I never trust a so-called "clean deal." In 2026, when I was sixteen and had just left the youth team due to a knee injury, I loitered around Hoa Xuan Stadium. I happened to read the training contract of a U17 midfielder, which contained a compensation clause overlapping with a young-talent development fund. After three weeks of digging, I discovered that 480 million dong had been transferred by mistake into the account of another football company. I wrote a 1,200-word piece for a local fanpage, and it drew 2,300 shares.
That article taught me one thing: cite based on contract number X, not on "according to a source." Since then, whenever someone talks about a deal, I always ask three questions. First, what does the main contract say. Second, what does the appendix say. Third, who signed the appendix. In the central-region deal, the appendix was signed by the small club's chairman, not the CEO, not the coach. A single signature, outside every public process.
By now the structure of the machine is clear. But the real question is not the structure. The real question is: why do the small clubs keep signing? The answer lies in next season's cash flow.
A small V.League club lives season to season. It has no reserve fund, no foreign owner pouring in unlimited money, no broadcast revenue large enough. It survives by balancing this season against the next. A loan with an obligation to buy lets it push an expense into next season — like a buy-now-pay-later loan, but without a bank, without interest, needing only a signature. When next season arrives, that expense triggers, and the club must sell another player to pay it. That is the spiral. Each season, it borrows one man, buys one outright, and sells one. The scale never balances. It is only kept from tipping over.
I reconstructed the transfer history of one small central club over the past five seasons, based on public information plus verification calls. The result startled me. Over those five seasons, the club let eight young players go: five on loans with obligations to buy, two sold outright, one out of contract. The money received was not enough to buy back one quality player. The club was bleeding talent with no compensation.
That machine has a name those in the trade use among themselves but rarely put in print. We call it the "two-layer contract." Layer one is the paper sent to the league organizers. Layer two is the appendix. Layer one exists to legitimize. Layer two exists to decide. And most disputes I have ever heard of begin at layer two, when one side changes its mind, or when the chairman changes.
A signature is only worth something when people start looking for a way to break their word.
I once sat in a cafe near a stadium, overhearing two men talk without knowing I was at the next table. One was an agent. One was a club official. They were discussing a player who had signed a buy obligation, but the borrowing club did not want to trigger it because the player was injured. The agent said: "If you don't trigger it, I'll bring out the appendix." The official was silent for a moment, then said: "Let me ask the chairman." That was the entire negotiation. No lawyers, no arbitrator, no court. Only an appendix and a relationship.
This is where I must say what I believe, even if it is not easy to hear. The small V.League clubs are not pure victims. They are the designers of the machine, together with the agents and the big clubs. They know the price. They accept it because the alternative — refusing the loan, keeping the player, accepting a weaker squad — means relegation, and relegation means losing far more. In Vietnamese football, survival is the condition of existence. Everything else is secondary.
I do not say this to defend the big clubs. I say it to point out that the problem is systemic, not a matter of individual morality. If only one club did this, it would be a violation. When nearly every mid-table club does it, it is a structure. And a structure cannot be fixed by appeals to morality. It can only be fixed by changing the money flow.
So where does the money come from? Here I must return to revenue. The V.League has three main income sources: parent-company sponsorship, player sales, and a small share from broadcast rights and ticket money. Of those three, only player sales can grow quickly. But player sales grow quickly only when there are buyers. And domestic buyers are limited, because the big clubs also have caps. So the domestic market saturates, and the small clubs are forced to look beyond the border.
That is why player exports have become the central story of Vietnamese football in recent years. A young player performing well in the V.League can catch the eye of a club in the region. Then the loan-with-obligation-to-buy machine is used again, but this time in reverse: the Vietnamese club loans the player to a foreign club with an obligation to buy. If the player succeeds, the Vietnamese club collects a fee, plus a sell-on percentage. If he fails, he returns, and the Vietnamese club has saved on wages in the meantime.
It sounds reasonable. But I have tracked several such cases, and I see a blind spot. When a Vietnamese player is loaned abroad with an obligation to buy, the Vietnamese club usually loses control over that player's development. It does not know how he trains, whether he is injured, what position he plays. It only knows the final result: triggered or not triggered. During that period, the player is merchandise sitting in someone else's warehouse. And when merchandise sits in someone else's warehouse, its value is set by someone else.

I once asked a technical director of a small club about this. He told me something I have never forgotten: "We have no choice. If we don't loan him, he stays, plays this season, then his contract ends, and he leaves for free. At least with a loan and buy obligation, we get something." That is the logic of a seller in a market where the buyer holds all the power. When you have no right to keep, you sell the right to keep. When you have no right to price, you accept someone else's price.
But here I want to offer an angle different from the orthodox story. The orthodox story says the big clubs are draining the small clubs. I do not deny that. But I believe the bigger blind spot lies elsewhere: the small clubs are turning themselves into transit stations, not academies. An academy produces and keeps people. A transit station only moves people through. If a club only moves people through, then after a few years, it has nothing left to move. Its academy is empty. Its squad is thin. And it must borrow the very players it once developed, from the club that bought it.
That is the final paradox of the machine. The developer becomes the borrower. The buyer becomes the lender. And the people market still meets, every night, over the phone, among people who know the rules of the game that no one writes down.
In the academy, they teach you to play football. The ghost contract is taught in the corridor.
I return to the central-region deal of January 12. The agent told me the buy-out fee in the appendix was 1.2 billion dong, paid over two years. The small club agreed, because if it did not, the big club would send the player elsewhere, and it would lose both the player and the relationship. That is the entire logic of the deal: not a purchase, not a sale, but holding a place in the queue. A place in the queue of those who might be bought, might be returned, might be forgotten.
Did the player know the appendix existed? I asked the agent. He was silent for a few seconds, then said: "He knows he is on loan. He does not know the number. The number is a matter for adults." That answer made me think for a long time. The player is the center of the deal, yet the last to know his own value. That is the nature of the transfer market, and also the reason I still sit here, taking notes, rather than in the stands watching football.
Now, look ahead. Where will the loan-with-obligation-to-buy machine go?
I believe it will rise, not fall, for at least two more seasons. The reason is simple: as parent companies keep tightening their belts, clubs will need more ways to defer costs. A loan with an obligation to buy is the perfect tool for that. It needs no approval, no capital, only a signature and an appendix.
But I also believe there will be a wave of disputes. When the obligation triggers at season's end and the small club lacks the money, it will seek to delay, renegotiate, or refuse. The big club will bring out the appendix. And because the appendix sits outside the public system, the dispute will not be settled in a sports court, but in the corridor. Exactly like everything else in Vietnamese football.
What I want readers to carry away from this piece is not a conclusion about right and wrong. I do not have enough facts to judge anyone. What I want is a question: if a club develops so well that it must constantly sell players to survive, then whose success is its success? If an academy exists only to supply semi-finished goods to others, is it developing players, or developing merchandise?
I leave that question here. Meanwhile, the market keeps meeting. Tonight, there may be another two a.m. call. And I will sit up again, open my laptop, and take notes.
